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Abstract: A ransomware attack is potentially highly damaging for businesses of all 
size, and due to being financially motivated, is increasing in occurrence. Although 
continuous innovations in ransomware complexity make it hard to defend against, 
simple safeguards are often ignored. The safeguard discussed in this article is that of 
correctly implementing and auditing file system access control to limit locations 
where ransomware can encrypt data should it execute under the user’s credentials. A 
discussion of the mechanisms within Microsoft’s New Technology File System 
(NTFS) that create the potential to over allocate permissions is provided. Following 
this, steps are presented to derive a clear policy to assist in ransomware protection. 
 
Introduction 
The potential for financial gain has resulted in the establishment of a multi-billion 
Dollar ransomware industry, which is founded on exploitation [1]. Those with weak, 
unprotected systems, as well as those with little security-specific knowledge are more 
likely to fall victim. Such users may not be able to adequately assess the potential 
risks and maybe caught unaware [2]. Those with the most to lose, for example a user, 
whom is heavily reliant on their IT system and its data for undertaking their daily 
business, heighten the potential for exploitation. 
 
Ransomware, as with all businesses aiming to maximise profit, is continuously 
increasing in innovation, making it harder to detect and in some cases virtually 
impossible to rectify without paying the ransom fee [3]. There are a wealth of 
Ransomware systems in operation, each with a slightly different way of acquiring 
execution on the host PC, as well as different mechanisms of encryption, but a 
commonality amongst all variations is that they aim to encrypt data stored on both 
local and remote directory structures. Some Ransomware performs the encryption 
process in an intensive short duration, whereas some mechanisms encrypt data slowly 
with the aim of ensuring the encrypted files are propagated through any back-up 
mechanisms, maximising damage and aiming to make recovery even more 
challenging. 
 
There are many potential aftermarket solutions aiming to help protect a system from 
ransomware; however, in this article we discuss how simply maximising the use of 
built-in system security controls can have a significant impact on preventing 
ransomware from acquiring execution on the host computer and encrypting data. It is 
worth noting that implementing strong access controls is not the definitive mechanism 
to prevent against a ransomware attack, but correctly restricting file system access can 
provide a strong first line of defence, and additionally contribute to improving the 
overall system security. 
 
How damage is done 
Let’s consider the encryption phase within the ransomware cycle [4]. In its primitive 
form, ransomware works in the same was as any other application interacting with the 
underlying file system. The traditional file use cycle, similar to that a user goes 
through when editing a text document, is that files are opened, modified, and stored. 
However, the fundamental difference is that ransomware is malicious in that it aims to 
create an encrypted version of the file and overwrite the original.   
 
The host operating system employs mediation mechanisms (known as the reference 
monitor [5]) to control who can access and modify files. A fundamental principle of 
reference monitor is that it is enforced and that it is not possible to interact with a file 
without the reference monitoring granting permission. Figure 1 illustrates how the 
reference monitoring works, as well as introducing some of the common technical 
phrases. The subject is the user and/or process interacting with the system, the object 
is the resource which the subject is requesting access to, and the configuration is the 
level of access they require. 
 
 
Figure 1: Reference Monitor 
 
 
Here lies a dilemma in that ransomware is a malicious piece of software, but the 
reference monitor is authorising permission for it to access, modify and delete files. 
Why? Because that ransomware has determined a way to execute and could be 
achieved through one of the three following ways: The first is by modifying the 
reference monitor (and operating system) through installing malicious software, the 
second is by achieving privilege escalation and operating under the maximum 
permission level, and the third is by simply executing under the user’s credentials and 
relies on the user having a high level of permission. The first two mechanisms can be 
hard to protection against and largely require strong security mechanisms embedded 
in operating system, as well as a culture of awareness amongst the users to prevent 
executing malicious software. In this paper, we consider the assignment and 
evaluation of file system permissions to minimise damage should a ransomware 
attack arise from executing under the user’s credentials and therefore acquiring their 
permission.  
  
The reference monitor is simply following the system policy, which is either set by 
the user, administrator or is the system default. A policy is the security restrictions 
enforced within the system, and in the particular context of this article, refers to both 
user and file system permissions.   
 
Your access control policy 
In terms of file system access control, the policy is the set of permissions granted to a 
specific user. If we consider the Microsoft environment, a policy could be that user 
“Bob” has “Full Control” on a file system resource such as “proposal.docx” that has 
been set through the Microsoft “Security” tab located in the “Properties” of a file or 
directory. Figure 2 shows the standard Microsoft interface for managing these 
permissions, and it is here where Bob’s permission can be set and evaluated.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: “Bob” has “FullControl” on proposal.docx 
 
Although in the presented example identifying Bob’s permission is a trivial process, 
there are many complicating factors that can inadvertently result in the over allocation 
of permissions, as well as difficulty in permission evaluation. In this section, we 
provide an overview of these complexities, demystifying access control policies for 
both standalone single-user PCs to networked multi-user environments. In latter 
sections we then discuss some ‘easy steps’ that can be taken to ensure that user 
permissions are correctly set to minimise the potential impact of such ransomware if 
an attack should occur.  
 
1) Group Membership 
A fundamental aspect of access control within the file system access control is that of 
group membership. A subject (group, user or process) that interacts with the file 
system can be a member of any group. This means that permissions can be inherited 
from any of the associated groups if they are entered within any Access Control List 
(ACL). Figure 2 illustrates an example ACL. Subjects, in this case users, will often be 
grouped together (separation of duty) to make management easier. However, 
understanding implemented permissions can become significantly more complex by 
group association [6]. To correctly evaluate a user's effective permissions you would 
have to know which groups they are a member of. Group allocation is set and 
examined through the “Computer Management” tool in Windows based systems. 
 
 
 
2) Propagation and Inheritance 
It is necessary to discuss the different mechanisms behind the way that NTFS 
permissions can propagate throughout the directory structure. Within the ACL there 
are two types of entries, which are formally named Access Control Entries (ACE). 
These types are: (1) Explicit and (2) Inherited. Explicit entries are those that are 
applied directly to the directory or file’s ACL, whereas inherited are those that are 
propagated from their parent directory. This makes implementation permissions easier 
as they can be set a high-level in the directory hierarchy and automatically propagate. 
This is of significant as permissions of different proposition types are processed 
differently and this leads us on to consider permissions accumulation. 
 
3) Accumulation  
Accumulation is the possibility for the subject to receive the effective permission of 
multiple different policies, resulting in the possibility for a subject to receive 
permissions from multiple different ACEs within the same ACL. Furthermore, any 
subject that interacts with the NTFS can be assigned to any number of groups, which 
can be entered into the ACE. This means that the user does not have to be directly 
entered into the ACE, and they could simply be a member of the group that is entered. 
 
The policy combination is handled within the operating system by the reference 
monitor, which combines the permissions together to effectively create the union of 
all the policies; however, there are few complexities within permission accumulation 
due to the structured way in which ACEs are processed. These are:  
 
• Explicit permissions take precedence over inherited permissions. 
• Explicit deny permissions always take precedence over apply permissions. 
• Permissions inherited from closer relatives take precedence over relatives.  
 
It might be expected that deny permissions always take precedence over apply 
permissions to ensure that during the policy combination stage the user always 
operates as the least possible privilege elevation. However, the first point regarding 
explicit permissions taking precedence over inherited permissions can result in a 
situation where an inherited deny permission is never reached 
 
A clear policy 
The aforementioned aspects of file system permissions create the potential to 
inadvertently introduce weaknesses that could easily be exploited by ransomware. 
Here we consider the necessity of maintaining file system access control permissions 
to prevent ransomware damage through deriving and maintaining a clear access 
control policy. It is true that ransomware will continue to evolve and new, more 
sophisticated methods will be developed. However, following the below steps not 
only prevents the ‘easy win’ ransomware attack from successfully encrypting 
sensitive data, it also ensures a strong level of system security aiming to prevent 
against other threats, such as a malicious employee. 
 
A clear policy is essential to ensure standardisation among allocated permissions and 
the functionality required by each role within the organisation. It is important to 
decide upon a policy for business of all sizes and it need not be an exhaustive and 
complicated task. Small business with only a few employees may neglect (through 
ignorance) the need to implement access controls beyond the defaults set by the 
operating systems, whereas large organisations may have many administrators 
changing file system permissions on a daily basis, and each is making ad hoc 
modifications based on their experience and knowledge. Making ad hoc permission 
modifications has the potential to introduce error and over allocated permissions, 
which both could introduce a vulnerability. 
 
The steps provided below are aimed to provide a starting point of criteria to consider 
for all businesses when creating their access control policy  
 
1) Least privilege and Separation of Duty 
In the contexts of file system control, the concept of least privilege is used to define 
the lowest possible level of access control required for a system user to undertake 
their daily tasks [7]. However, there will not be a single definition of least privilege 
for all users. A managerial user may need permission to view and modify certain 
employee records but does not need to see customer invoices, whereas secretarial staff 
should have permission to view, create and modify invoices but no permission to 
view employee records. A ransomware attack on employees in either of these roles 
would cause damage, but the separation of duty will help to compartmentalised the 
damage, resulting in only parts of the directory structure being encrypted. 
An issue with implementing such role-based access control is that it is entirely 
feasible that new roles are also created as the company operations change and new 
employees are recruited. This can be problematic as if the new role is similar to one of 
the current roles, an administrator might make changes to the role by broadening the 
access control policy and allowing wide and potentially less restrictive access. This is 
problematic because any reduction in distance between the separations of duties 
reduces any potential compartmentalised and minimisation of ransomware damage. 
 
2) Implementation 
The position of the access control implementation in the directory structure hierarchy 
needs careful consideration to ensure that the data is restricted as far up the hierarchy 
as possible. There is a clear trade-off to be achieved here between administrative 
complexity and the level of restrictiveness. Access control can be implemented on a 
file level, but implementing restrictions based on each file would be tiresome, 
whereas setting permissions high up the directory structure to be propagated might 
make it challenging to effectively implement a middle section whereby two different 
roles both have permissions. For example, consider two distinctly separate 
hierarchical folder structures for both managerial and secretarial users. If both folder 
structures are secured on the root directory, it could become problematic if either user 
group needed to have access to a subdirectory within each role’s hierarchy. At this 
point a new permission will need to be specified at the sufficient point within the 
hierarchy to only allow the user access to the locations required. 
 
Considering the granularity of permissions is also of key importance. Microsoft’s 
New Technology File System (NTFS) has six standard groups (read, write, modify, 
etc.) [8] and the possibility to create fine-grained permissions through using any 
combination of the fourteen individual attributes. There are specific instances 
whereby over allocation is performed through only using the standard groups. For 
example, only “Full Control” has the permission to delete directories. This can be 
problematic as assigning “Full Control” on a directory will allow a user to delete the 
directory itself and its entire contents. Using the “Modify” level disables the potential 
to delete directories, but this would be too restrictive as a user would be able to create 
directories but not delete. The solution is to use the combination of the “Modify” on 
the root directory without any propagation, followed by “Full Control” reclusively 
propagating through all child directories. This is a clear example whereby careful 
consideration is required to determine how to translate a user’s role into a series of 
access control policies. 
 
How the permissions are structured can have significant implications on 
administrative effort as well as introducing potential for making mistakes. 
Furthermore, all mechanisms to improve clarity in the allocation of permissions 
should be taken to reduce the potential for error. This means never implementing 
permissions on a user basis, rather using groups that represent roles within the system. 
As there is no mechanism to store comments within the allocation permissions, it is 
essential to ensure that the group name is something that adequately describes the 
permission. For example, something like “ManagerialFullControl” is more 
appropriate than “RoleOne”. 
 
3) Auditing 
Auditing is a very important task that should not be neglected. Old redundant 
permission are often  left behind as employees leave, roles change, and new shared 
directories are introduced overtime. It is important to identify these permissions and 
remove them to avoid potential exploitation. It is also worth frequently revaluating 
how policies have been implemented to determine if any users are over privileged. A 
user will complain if they do not have the permission to undertake their job, but they 
have no incentive to report an over allocation. 
 
There are many aftermarket tools available to assist in auditing permissions [9]; 
however, the Microsoft environment has a fundamental evaluation tool built-in. The 
“Effective Access” tab within the security properties allows you to query what a user 
or group’s effective permission is on a specific directory. This is somewhat 
cumbersome as it has to be performed on a directory by directory basis. Figure 3 
shows an example of the effective access being displayed for the user Bob on the C:\ 
directory. The permission is detailed in terms of the individual permissions they are 
receiving on that specific location.  
 
 
Figure 3: Effective Access 
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